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Neoliberalism as liberatioN: 
the statehood Program aNd 
the remakiNg of the PalestiNiaN 
NatioNal movemeNt 
Raja Khalidi and Sobhi SamouR
The Palestinian statehood-by-2011 program, framed through neolib-
eral institution building, redefines and diverts the Palestinian libera-
tion struggle. Focusing on its economic aspects, and in particular the 
underlying neoliberal thought that goes beyond narrow economic policy 
applications, this essay argues that the program cannot succeed either as 
the midwife of independence or as a strategy for Palestinian economic 
development. Its weaknesses, the authors contend, derive not only from 
neoliberalism’s inability to deliver sustainable and equitable economic 
growth worldwide, but also because neoliberal “governance” under occu-
pation, however “good,” cannot substitute for the broader struggle for 
national rights nor ensure the Palestinian right to development. 
The PaleSTinian naTional libeRaTion movemenT emerged in the early 1960s with 
the primary goal of “liberating the land and the people” from Zionist settler-
colonialism. Today, with colonization accelerating throughout Palestine and 
with Palestinian refugees—mostly deprived of their national, civil, and human 
rights—still dispersed around the world, this aim sounds like an embarrassing 
echo of a distant past.1 The failure of the strategy of armed struggle to deliver 
its maximalist (pre-1967) or even more limited (post-1988) goals became 
patently clear with the quelling of the second intifada. Meanwhile, the alter-
nate strategy of seeking to liberate a fraction of historical Palestine by negotia-
tions and diplomacy has proven equally futile. 
The Palestinian national liberation movement at its inception was an inte-
gral part of a broader political project of the anticolonial struggle and the 
establishment of a just world order. Once in power, however, most of the 
movements associated with these struggles failed to deliver on their prom-
ises, instead allowing neocolonial relations of production and exchange to 
bolster their own power and secure privileges for the national bourgeoi-
sie and the “international investor.”2 More recently, the dynamics of such 
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relations have been complemented by the irresistible “logic” of neoliberalism 
and globalization—striking examples being the African National Congress’s 
embrace of neoliberalism and the neoliberal “shock therapy” and rise of an 
“oligarchy” in countries of the former Soviet Union and bloc.3 
Then as now, neocolonialism and neoliberalization followed formal inde-
pendence, and it is on this basis that the Palestinian statehood program, 
Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, represents an extraordinary 
case. Coming amidst a historic crisis of legitimacy of the Palestinian national 
movement in the wake of unprecedented internecine political divisions, the 
program represents a new, apparently “home-grown” strategy to achieve 
statehood through neoliberal institution building. Enjoying growing interna-
tional endorsement, this national liberation through neoliberalism redefines 
the Palestinian liberation struggle as it has hitherto been known. 
The Journal of Palestine Studies recently probed, in two interviews, the 
political and economic thinking of the strategy’s most prominent champions, 
Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and chief execu-
tive officer of the Palestine Investment Fund (and economic advisor to PLO 
Chairman and PA President Abbas), Mohamad Mustafa.4 This essay, which 
does not address the Gaza Strip and its economic conditions,5 is not a com-
ment on those interviews as much as it is a review of the neoliberal world-
view that underpins new Palestinian political and economic thinking and 
which, in our view, endangers the Palestinian national liberation agenda by 
errors both of commission and omission.6 
the Pa Program: eNdiNg the occuPatioN, establishiNg the state?
Since Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, there have 
been repeated waves of armed or popular resistance to which Israel has gen-
erally responded with sharp repression and economic sanctions followed by 
gradual restoration of relations with Palestinians and economic inducements 
to pacification. The most recent of these has been Israel’s “economic peace” 
policy. Earlier episodes have included Moshe Dayan’s policy of open bridges 
and cooptation of traditional elites in the 1970s and Menahem Milson’s Israeli 
Civil Administration and Palestinian Village Leagues in the 1980s. The Israel-
PLO Protocol on Economic Relations of 1994 added a whole new meaning 
to pacification with its promised “peace dividend” and the material benefits 
it bestowed on a new class of PLO bureaucrats who had returned from exile 
and on their Oslo-inspired “self-government” structures.7 
The economic gains delivered by periods of apparent “calm” and “growth” 
since 1967 were easily reversible, and such interludes mainly produced lulls 
in the Palestinian resistance that has continued in various forms since the 
onset of occupation. In fact, the only clear economic outcomes of the pat-
tern have been the steady erosion of Palestine’s development potential, the 
degradation of its human capital, and the gradual depletion of its natural 
resources.8 
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Today, with the palpable failure of armed struggle, the PA is offering the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank a program predicated upon delivering 
growth and prosperity without any strategy for resistance or challenge to 
the parameters of occupation. The program is inspired by a model of neo-
liberal governance increasingly widespread in the region, indeed in neoco-
lonial states around the world, but which socially, culturally, and politically 
remains an alien creation of the Washington-based international financial 
institutions. The PA’s neoliberal turn has generally been associated with 
the premiership of Salam Fayyad as of the 2007 formation of his caretaker 
government following the Fatah-Hamas struggle and the establishment of 
parallel governments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But the genesis of 
this ideology in the Palestinian context dates back much earlier and runs 
deeper. 
The PA institution building for statehood plan aims at a Palestinian state 
by mid-2011. The program is predicated on the soft assumption that by that 
time Israel and the PLO will have made significant progress toward achieving 
a final status agreement or at least recognition of a state within agreed bor-
ders. The PA’s mid-term progress report Homestretch to Freedom, of August 
2010, has reiterated this timeframe, and Fayyad’s most recent pronounce-
ments have confirmed his belief in the imminence of this event.9
Failing an elusive Israeli-Palestinian negotiation breakthrough, the sur-
vival of a state born in such conditions rests on the wildcard of international 
recognition—though certainly more will be required than the symbolic 
gesture of recognition by over 100 countries when the PLO first declared 
Palestinian independence in 1988. In any case, within two years of the pro-
gram’s unveiling, “institutional facts on the ground” are supposed to have 
been created and a wave of popular support will have proven to the world 
that the Palestinians are ready for statehood. 
Meanwhile, donor funding to PA coffers has exceeded $1.5 billion annu-
ally since 2007, and with the internal security situation increasingly under 
control, economic growth in 2009 and 2010 has 
begun to recover from its previous eight-year decline. 
The 8+ percent economic growth witnessed in the 
West Bank since 2008 is heralded as signaling the 
first green shoots of the PA reform strategy. An urban 
construction boom, car shows, international hotels, 
fashionable restaurants, virtual stock trading systems, 
and e-government are seen as evidence of a vibrant 
economy. Such developments have no doubt given 
credence to the statehood-or-bust narrative, creating something akin to an 
“economic-peace bubble” emanating from Ramallah. Mohammad Mustafa 
believes that the PA economic policy under a peace agreement would deliver 
20 percent annual growth10—a rate that the most successful developing 
countries in Asia could have only dreamed of, and which recalls the PA’s 
promotion of Gaza in the mid-1990s as the next Singapore. 
Such developments have 
no doubt given credence to 
the statehood-or-bust nar-
rative, creating something 
akin to an “economic-
peace bubble” emanating 
from Ramallah.
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Given the policy pedigree of its main architects,11 the PA statehood pro-
gram is replete with seductive appeals to plurality; accountability; equal 
opportunity; the empowerment of its “citizens”; the protection of social, 
economic, and political rights; and the state’s efficient provision of services 
and public goods. The statehood plan, as well as the 2008 Palestinian Reform 
and Development Plan (PRDP) it incorporates, faithfully reflect the eco-
nomic policy agenda set forth in the so-called “Post-Washington Consensus” 
(PWC) orthodoxy advanced by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), the 
World Bank Group, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), since the 
late 1990s.12 
The more rhetorical than substantial overhaul of the previous Washington 
Consensus (WC) reflects a more “inclusive” form of neoliberalism, without 
abandoning its free market-centric, fiscally conservative, and light-touch 
regulatory core identity. The transition to the PWC came largely as a result 
of political and intellectual dissatisfaction globally (and even from within 
the institutions concerned) with its poor outcomes and flawed theoretical 
underpinnings. The PWC envisions a responsive, capable state that ensures 
the maintenance of security and public order, promotes opportunities for all, 
and empowers its citizens—who will now have the moral responsibility to 
rely on themselves instead of a paternalistic social welfare state.13 
For the PA, the achievement of Palestinian statehood depends on at least 
four interdependent and mutually reinforcing components, spelled out in its 
main documents which echo PWC discourse. The first of these is assuring 
public security and the rule of law; the PA plan’s full embrace of the PWC 
security-development nexus is clear in its allocation of $228 million to the 
Security Sector Reform and Transformation Program for 2008–2010. This 
linkage, according to which there can be no sustainable development with-
out law and order—and conversely no sustainable security without devel-
opment—has for years been the mantra not only of donors but also of the 
Israeli government. The Israelis have employed this circular logic for their 
own ends, setting security conditions that the PA cannot possibly or cred-
ibly meet, hence providing a priori justification for restricting Palestinian 
economic activities.14 
The second component is commitment to building accountable institu-
tions, which has been a hallmark of the current PA government’s policies 
and declarations as a means of differentiating itself from the Fatah-dominated 
governments that preceded it. According to the plan, institution building 
requires the PA to “continuously improve the performance, transparency, 
and accountability of the public sector through reforms aimed at tackling 
waste, inefficiency, and corrupt practices.”15 It should be noted that there 
have been few, if any, new institutions designed with sovereign economic 
functions; rather, the PA continues to tinker with those designed fifteen years 
ago to serve a five-year transitional “self-government.” Furthermore, most 
of the “institutional reform” to date has focused on consolidating PA public 
finances, the purse strings of which are held by the prime minister. 
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The third essential feature of the PA governance model is effective ser-
vice delivery as a means of gaining legitimacy from citizens and investors. 
Pursuit of this goal, facilitated by the concentration of financial—as well as 
some political and security—powers in one person, has been a top priority, 
primarily because better municipal services, public utilities, and even some 
basic social services are within the reach of the limited governance toolbox 
the PA possesses. 
With security and the rule of law, accountable institutions, and efficient 
service delivery all anchored in—and guaranteed by—the PA, the practice 
of good governance has been elevated “to the status of a national goal in and 
of itself.”16 And this is the foundation of the fourth prerequisite for state-
hood: private sector growth. This requires “an extensive program of legal, 
regulatory and administrative reform . . . as part of the effort to achieve 
greater economic self-reliance,”17 which means that the state’s involvement 
in the economy must be restricted to investing in public infrastructure, creat-
ing market-friendly institutions, and intervening when markets fail to work 
efficiently. In other words, the PA’s idea of the public sector’s role in the 
economy is predicated on the sort of export-led development strategy and 
“sound” macroeconomic policy whose theoretical assumptions have been in 
doubt ever since the model was proclaimed and effectively buried with the 
recent global financial crisis.18 
However flawed its economic policies, it should not be understood that 
the PA is detached from reality. PA planners readily acknowledge the chal-
lenges they face. They understand that the type of institution building they 
pursue cannot provide stimulus for growth on its own, and they are fully 
aware of the ongoing pace of colonization and Israel’s control of most of their 
critical economic decisions. They even acknowledge that their strategy is not 
a substitute for politics; countless hours are spent negotiating with Israel to 
obtain the occupying power’s approval to build roads, import equipment, 
establish industrial zones, speed commercial clearance at borders, reduce 
transaction costs, and so on. What is less understandable is why, given such 
awareness, they continue to re-engage in processes defined by the very occu-
pation parameters that assure futility. 
In the “can-do” thinking of today’s PA, such a program represents the best 
political choice for an otherwise emasculated “national authority” struggling 
to maintain its vital role as service provider of last resort, and hence its legiti-
macy and rationale. The powerful appeal of personal prosperity that PA poli-
cies exert on the Palestinian middle class might yet prove to be a potent basis 
on which to claim political legitimacy. But this is a risky and untried strategy, 
and the more the PA is perceived by its constituents as an extension of the 
occupation, the greater the likelihood that the strategy will backfire, espe-
cially if the 2011 “appointment with freedom” passes without liberation.19 
More problematic from a developmental perspective, however, is the view 
held by PA planners and their influential backers that this program represents 
the best economic option—not just for a postliberation future, but even for 
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today under occupation and without sovereignty. With surprising ease for a 
people that have struggled for their independence and identity for genera-
tions, the idea that there is no alternative to such an economic framework 
has gained traction and credibility. Equally perplexing, given the Palestinian 
tradition of vibrant and pluralistic political debate, is the fact that PA neo-
liberal policy preferences remain largely unquestioned, except by a handful 
of analysts and the occasional international NGO or UN agency (and even 
then, only elliptically).20 While Hamas’s economic policy has hardly had the 
chance to develop, economic practices in Gaza by force of circumstance have 
tended toward autarky and rent seeking (managing the tunnel economy). 
Meanwhile, former Marxists and other “leftist” intellectuals from Fatah have 
served as ministers in successive Fayyad cabinets since 2007, embracing the 
neoliberal program and thus submitting to U.S. hegemony and sustaining its 
local agency.
coNtradictioNs: locatiNg Neoliberalism iN the Pa 
The global reach of neoliberalism is inextricably linked with U.S. eco-
nomic and political interests and the BWI, which it dominates.21 In the 
Middle East, U.S. geopolitical interests together with BWI policy designs are 
primarily focused on securing a stable environment for the supply of oil, U.S. 
investment in the wider region, and surplus capital from states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). Crucially, the economic liberalization and new 
trade initiatives that have resulted are consonant with an agenda of political 
and economic normalization with Israel (the “New Middle East”).22 
The embrace of neoliberal policies by Arab governments and their elites 
started in the early 1990s, primarily with North African states as a supposed 
antidote to their failed socialist or statist development strategies. Sadat’s infi-
tah (opening-up) policy had already set the tone, though less as an embrace 
of liberalization than as a loosening of state controls over the economy. In 
Jordan, the neoliberal agenda was launched with the signing of the Israeli-
Jordanian peace treaty, which created new opportunities for the export of 
Israeli capital and goods. 
More often than not, countries that have implemented neoliberal reforms 
have experienced rising rates of poverty and unemployment, in most cases 
accompanied by the rise of a new social class whose fortunes are directly 
linked to the privatization of state enterprises and economic liberalization.23 
More recently, the extreme neoliberal policies imposed during the US occu-
pation of Iraq—ranging from the lifting of foreign ownership restrictions 
and wide scale privatization to a 5-percent across-the-board tariff regime 
and some of the lowest taxes in the world—have been described as “state-
building in reverse.”24 
The PA’s neoliberal turn thus has to be understood in the context of long-
standing efforts to reconfigure Middle Eastern states, their economies, and 
the region as a whole. It comes in response to the U.S.-sponsored attempt to 
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prop up a “moderate,” more pliable, Palestinian leadership, integrate Israel 
in the wider region, and manage (not resolve) the conflict. Attempts to make 
the PA embrace neoliberalism existed even before its creation in 1994, in the 
context of the BWI role and emerging neoliberal thought in the “regional 
economic development working group” of the pre-Oslo Madrid multilateral 
negotiations, in which the PLO participated. 
By 1993, Harvard economists and the World Bank, in association with 
several Palestinian economists, had entered the arena. They recommended 
a fairly neoliberal set of economic policies for guiding the PA through what 
was still seen as a five-year transition to independence.25 Similarly, in 1999, 
a detailed study by the Council on Foreign Relations (also with Palestinian 
expert collaboration) argued that the implementation of good governance 
reforms, rule of law, and policies ensuring a conducive climate for invest-
ment were necessary preconditions for Palestinian independence.26 
In locating and identifying “real-existing” neoliberal policies implemented 
by the PA, it is important to clarify a seeming contra-
diction concerning PA institutional capabilities and 
limits. Even if the PA had wanted to pursue an alter-
native strategy, it would have been stymied by U.S. 
pressure, the structural realities of Israel’s occupation, 
dependence on donor money, and BWI advocacy. All 
these factors contributed to minimal “policy space”—
the freedom to determine economic policies without 
external constraints being binding. This remains the 
situation today. The limited available policy space also 
means that the PA is deprived of policy tools needed to actually implement 
the full package of the most conventional neoliberal policies. 
Despite such limitations, the current PA program attempts to exploit all 
available policy space (especially fiscal, where it has some reach) in order 
to advance a neoliberal agenda. Remarkably, then, what the PA statehood 
plan represents, at best, is a strategy to expand policy space for the further 
implementation of the neoliberal framework in policy areas over which it has 
currently no control within the existing configuration of Israel’s occupation. 
In one sense, the current historic moment echoes the transfer in an earlier 
era of limited economic governance authority (within the Israeli occupa-
tion envelope) to the newly created PA. As has since become clear, the 1994 
transfer amounted to little more than transferring the burdens, obligations, 
and financing of occupation to local shoulders. 
One does not need to look far for examples of the extreme limits of the PA’s 
policy space. Without an independent central bank, the PA has no means to 
reduce interest rates and inflation or to set a competitive currency exchange 
rate in support of export-led economic growth—measures that a conven-
tional neoliberal program would prescribe. Similarly, its commitment to the 
Economic Protocol with Israel means that it cannot independently reduce 
tariff rates or Value Added Taxes, so its own trade liberalization must track 
Even if the PA had wanted 
to pursue an alternative 
strategy, it would have 
been stymied by U.S. pres-
sure, the structural reali-
ties of Israel’s occupation, 
dependence on donor 
money, and BWI advocacy.
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that of Israel. Nor is there much for the PA to privatize, as public holdings 
in telecommunications were sold to private investors early on under Yasir 
Arafat’s PA. Additionally, most remaining public assets, enterprises it owns or 
in which it holds shares, as well as revenue streams from public franchises, 
have since been consolidated in the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF) fol-
lowing IMF-designed budget and fiscal transparency reforms of 2003.27
Even neoliberal policy areas where the PA has some formal control are 
heavily circumscribed by the structural realities of Israel’s occupation. For 
instance, the first Palestine Investment Conference, held in Bethlehem in May 
2008 as part of the PA’s “Palestine is open for business” declaration to attract 
foreign direct investment28 resulted in the much-celebrated announcement 
of Qatari government financing of the first Palestinian planned city, Rawabi. 
Yet the project, started in early 2010, has been regularly held up by delays 
in obtaining Israeli approval at various stages of planning and construc-
tion, most recently because of “environmental concerns” about the planned 
city.29 
The realities of Israel’s occupation and ongoing land expropriation, com-
bined with the PA’s limited jurisdiction, also inhibit the full pursuit of yet 
another BWI policy prescription, namely the protection and enforcement 
of well-defined property rights, which are prerequisites for an investment-
friendly environment as conceived by neoliberal economic policy. In other 
words, no matter how much effort the PA invests in showcasing the West 
Bank as an attractive destination for investment, and no matter how hard 
Tony Blair tries to obtain Israeli approval for this or that permit or project, 
Israel still calls the shots. This can, and indeed does, delay or ultimately frus-
trate investment efforts by international and Palestinian investors. 
The available space that the PA can most feasibly exploit to pursue neo-
liberal policies lie in the realm of its fiscal policy, notably through (a) reduc-
ing public expenditure (in particular the public sector wage bill and what 
is referred to as “net lending”), and (b) increasing tax revenues.30 The PA 
wants to cut the wage bill by a mixture of layoffs, hiring freezes (except in 
the health and education sectors), and a public sector pay freeze in order to 
bring it from 27 percent to 22 percent of the budget at the end of 2010.31 The 
scale of projected layoffs, around 40,000 public sector workers, has been 
described as “probably the harshest attack on any public sector in the Middle 
East in recent history,”32 and whether the PA bureaucracy will resist these 
measures remains to be seen. 
“Net lending,” meanwhile, is the PA’s indirect subsidization of customers 
or municipalities that have failed to pay their utility bills owed to Israeli com-
panies through the Israeli government’s deduction of PA clearance revenues. 
But while this had reached around 10.6 percent of the Palestinian GDP,33 the 
PA’s efforts to reduce it by requiring citizens to prove they had paid all their 
utility bills before they could request civil documents had to be abandoned 
after a storm of public protest.34 Concurrently, however, the PA has begun 
implementing plans to install up to 300,000 prepaid electricity meters across 
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Palestinian households to end what BWI discourse terms a “culture of entitle-
ment.” Rural areas and refugee camps will also be included, echoing the 
installation of meters in the South African township of Soweto (a key locus 
in the anti-apartheid struggle) a decade earlier. Then as now, cutoffs from 
services for households that do not fall within the government’s definition of 
“vulnerable groups” can be justified as the market outcome of poor budget-
ing of household resources.35 
Inevitably, the PA’s fiscal reform efforts in a situation of occupation face 
daunting obstacles. It is saddled with a high and chronic budget deficit,36 
which not only means sustained dependency on external assistance, but 
also reduced resources for development expenditure (such as investment 
in public infrastructure). The PA’s public commitment to an all-out effort 
to reduce aid dependency would exacerbate the fragile economic situation 
given a relatively high, mostly imported, inflation; unemployment of over 20 
percent; a third of the population living below the poverty line; and as many 
as one in five households directly or indirectly dependent on employment 
by the PA.37
As explained in the PRDP, the PA seeks to increase tax revenues largely 
through administrative measures aimed at improving the efficiency of domes-
tic tax collection and customs revenues. The PA is also considering and the 
introduction of new taxes for inheritance or real estate. Clearly, however, the 
PA’s approach to deficit reduction has focused far more on the expenditure 
side of the budget equation, as seen above. 
Though economic gains resulting from such policies are reversible, the PA 
is expected to stay the path of these reforms. Indeed, recent World Bank and 
IMF recommendations counsel still greater reforms while in the same breath 
recognizing that Israel’s occupation undermines the very achievements of 
these reforms.38 Such obsessive focus on open-ended reform risks making 
the occupation less visible to Palestinians, less costly for Israel and donors, 
and, in the process, more efficient. Nevertheless, the PA hopes that the nega-
tive impact of its measures will be more than compensated for by a revival 
of the Palestinian private sector. Assuming sustained donor support for the 
economy, the idea is that the private sector—assured by the PA’s reforms for 
creating investment-friendly institutions—would become an engine of eco-
nomic growth. Crucially, however, private sector growth depends largely 
on the easing of Israel’s restrictions on Palestinian economic activity. Israel’s 
security-first logic suggests that such easing might be forthcoming if the PA’s 
ability to restore and uphold “law and order” were enhanced. This includes 
judicial reforms, initiatives promoting the rule of law, outreach and citizen 
awareness programs, improving the effectiveness of courts, daily policing, 
as well as re-staffing the PA security and intelligence services and the early 
retirement of PLO veterans—in short, a kind of peaceful regime change.39 
To be sure, in light of the many internal problems that have plagued 
the PA political system, such as political interference in court decisions, 
“anarchy of weapons” and lack of judicial oversight, the need for reform 
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was overwhelming. But according to a first review of judicial and legisla-
tive reforms under the Fayyad government, their successes have been 
mixed and slow, and institution building has been more authoritarian than 
democratic.40 
On the other hand, the verdict on the PA’s efforts to strengthen its secu-
rity apparatus, with the support of the EU Police Coordinating Office for 
Palestinian Police Support and U.S. Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, has 
been favorable, even earning the praise of the Israeli security establish-
ment.41 Without doubt, the U.S.-trained National Security Force battalions 
have reduced the cost of the occupation and made the outsourcing of secu-
rity for Israel more effective than under the previous PA.42 Meanwhile, the 
new PA security regime has been accompanied by increasing incidents of 
torture, intimidation, and repression of civil rights of the PA’s opponents.43 
Such human rights violations could appear as yet another contradiction of the 
PA’s neoliberal agenda and its emphasis on “the rule of law.” At the same time, 
the PA would certainly not be the first government to have demonstrated the 
usefulness, if not the necessity, of combining neoliberalism with a strong-arm 
security-state apparatus.44
One potential role for the internal security forces in the new Palestinian 
economy would be maintaining the smooth flow of security-cleared 
Palestinian workers to proposed industrial parks near the Israeli border 
(often in the separation wall seam zone) to circumvent Israeli closure. The 
PA hopes that such enclave-style industrial parks, which follow the familiar 
neoliberal model of cross-border development involving international capital 
and cheap local labor, will contribute to its export-led growth strategy. 
Thus, the PA neoliberal growth strategy is based on, and will be furthered 
by, its security coordination with Israel, domestic policing, and effective 
containment of internal political opponents. Two supporters of the strat-
egy recently noted in the Wall Street Journal that the PA’s security reform 
efforts are “the sine qua non for economic expansion . . . and a model for 
the state-building program in general.”45 Such an affirmation not only turns 
economic development experience on its head, but sends a disconcerting 
message about the price of neoliberal economic growth.
Simply stated, because it has no evident strategy for tackling the real 
“external” obstacles, PA attention has shifted to a range of perceived “inter-
nal” obstacles to statehood, and its program is consequently aimed at root-
ing them out. Seen from this angle, then, the PA statehood program must 
embed the discourse and practice of neoliberalism in Palestinian society. 
It is here where the concept of the rule of law, so central in the rhetoric 
of PWC, proves its instrumental value. Underlying its technical, neutral 
vocabulary is the desire to escape politics and, indeed, the very politi-
cal nature of the question of Palestine. The statehood program encour-
ages the idea that citizens may have to acquiesce in occupation but will 
not be denied the benefits of smoother running traffic, a liberal education 
curriculum, investor-friendly institutions, efficient public service delivery, 
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and, for the middle class, access to luxury hotel chains and touring theatre 
performances. 
With the PA’s efforts to make its institutions accountable and transpar-
ent and to ensure better service delivery, civil society is promised greater 
means to voice dissatisfaction and to report corrupt bureaucrats. It is through 
this strategy that the PA hopes to establish a “participatory democracy” and 
“vibrant economy.” Once internalized, and with the PA’s commitment to pro-
vision of basic health and education services, Palestinians—so they are led to 
believe—will be able to participate in local and global markets, able to enjoy 
their share of the benefits of economic growth. 
PA officials have denounced Israel’s economic peace and any attempts 
to substitute it for real peace, but the neoliberal policy framework they are 
putting in place, combined with their inability to challenge Israel on the 
ground (or elsewhere), means that the PA must rely on Israel to facilitate their 
statehood agenda. To all intents and purposes, that adds up to co-habitation 
with economic peace, manifested in Palestinian tolerance of occupation and 
economic engagement with Israel within parameters set by the occupying 
power. It remains to be seen whether challenges to a PA strategy equivalent 
to normalizing, depoliticizing, and neoliberalizing the Palestinian struggle 
will provoke the wrath of the PA’s “reformed” security apparatus and exclu-
sion by its institutions. 
is there really No alterNative?
It is ironic that the all-important “local ownership” of neoliberal reform, 
as manifested in the PA statehood plan, comes at a time when the global 
financial crisis has led to a legitimacy crisis for—if not of—neoliberalism. 
An economic policy framework under revision by its designers seems an 
odd choice to deliver development to a damaged and fragmented economy 
like that of the occupied Palestinian territories.46 But after an unwinnable 
armed struggle and an inconclusive peace process, a war-weary Palestinian 
population could find the PA’s promise hard to resist.47 Regardless of their 
social class and whether they live under direct Israeli rule in Oslo-designated 
Area C of the West Bank or in Jerusalem, or under indirect occupation within 
PA-controlled areas—it is only natural that many Palestinians attach a pre-
mium to quality of life, knowing the steep price in human life and property 
that Israel will exact to punish resistance. 
In these conditions, Israelis, international financial institutions, donors, 
and media have been able to conflate the idea of economic peace, advocated 
by an Israeli prime minister who implemented radical market reforms in 
the 1990s, with the PA state-building program engineered by a Palestinian 
prime minister who has faithfully applied the PWC neoliberal prescriptions 
under occupation. In some respects, the two initiatives are not so dissimilar. 
The tradeoff proposed by economic peace is that a nonsovereign Palestinian 
state-like entity may bask in the warmth of Israeli economic growth and even 
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enjoy some of its own. But in return, it will have to postpone or effectively 
abandon the struggle for Palestinian national rights. What the PA program 
promises is not just that the “right” sort of state and free-market economy 
can be built, but that they can be designed and prepared even while occu-
pation continues and the Palestinian polity remains divided politically and 
geographically. And, in an unusual twist, it promises that such a state, absent 
a negotiated political settlement, will be able to impose itself as an indepen-
dent and viable entity recognized and accepted by Israel. 
Of greater concern is that the state model envisaged by the PA is precisely 
of the sort that has wrecked already sovereign economies around the world 
through neoliberal-inspired programs. Such an entity, even if recognized as 
a state, will be powerless to resist the imperatives of continuing Israeli occu-
pation in whatever guise. Soft physical borders cannot protect Palestinian 
national security, and soft economic borders can only perpetuate Palestinian 
dependence on Israel and allow personal prosperity for some but communal 
impoverishment for all.
And yet, other relevant development experiences that could be emulated—
from Latin America to South-East Asia, not to mention one closer to home 
(Israel)—do exist. These countries experienced rapid and sustained eco-
nomic growth through continuous, systemic, and centrally organized state 
intervention and planning. It is true that the Palestinian experience of gov-
ernment intervention in the market has been mixed, mainly involving the 
PWC mainstays of divestment from public-owned utilities and investment in 
private (often joint) ventures, as well as soft-touch regulation.48 Still, it is next 
to impossible to find any evidence, historical or theoretical, for sustained 
economic growth—in particular in the context of state-building—without 
market intervention on a grand scale.49 This is a far cry from the selective, 
market-correcting interventionism allowed for by the PWC. 
The alternative, heterodox policy framework for successful development, 
which has been marginalized in neoclassical-dominated economic discourse 
and the policy practice of BWI, is not the subject of this essay. But public owner-
ship, public services, public investment, and public welfare seem to be the key 
policy innovations of the coming period. A recalibration of conventional wis-
dom is underway in response not only to the “public good” nature of economic 
governance, but also in acknowledgment that the diversity of development 
experiences calls for a range of policy responses and institutional forms.50 
Moreover, the past decades of Israeli-Palestinian economic relations have 
shown that no Palestinian economic development strategy can be effective 
as long as the Israeli occupation policy of asymmetric containment is not dis-
mantled through ending occupation and achieving sovereignty and national 
rights. Given that this is not imminent, and with the neoliberal discourse 
firmly entrenched, it could seem reasonable to conclude that the PA state-
hood narrative, as Tony Blair would have it, is the “only game in town.”51 
Other scenarios, such as abandoning the PA experience altogether and 
leaving the governance of the occupied territories to Israel or even to an 
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international trusteeship, might seem far-fetched. Certainly such “new 
games” would represent a dramatic break with, and retreat from, the past 
fifteen years of self-administration under occupation. Yet, above and beyond 
whatever political advantage might be gained by postponing an end of con-
flict until such time as the balance of power is less sharply skewed against 
Palestinian interests, their possible strategic virtue for the economy should 
not be dismissed. For one thing, changing the rules of the game could pre-
vent the neoliberal inroads already made into the Palestinian economic pol-
icy and legal framework from being locked into final status arrangements and 
allow time for other policy options to be considered in a broader context. 
And even though such alternative political scenarios would mean a similarly 
neoliberal administration (Israeli or international), it could shift the debate 
on Palestinian economic space and political strategy back into the realm of 
the realities of a nonsovereign, colonized people struggling for liberation.
Short of such options, it is safe to assume that the PLO, or what is left 
of it, will not bow out and leave the Palestinian people to their fate under 
indefinite occupation, and it is unlikely that the scenarios mentioned above 
will materialize. But in the eventuality of a prolongation of the PA as a non-
sovereign government, are there economic alternatives it could pursue if it 
wanted to lay the ground for sovereignty and real statehood? 
Assuming for the sake of argument that PA neoliberalism were to be dis-
carded tomorrow, a feasible strategy capable of confronting and redressing 
Israeli asymmetric containment could be envisaged, through what might be 
termed “economic resistance.” Such an option may not lead to high or con-
tinuous growth, but it could help halt and possibly reverse the ongoing cycle 
of de-development. A participatory process of development policy-making 
could place the war-torn economy on a footing that would allow it to cope 
with the constraints imposed by long-term occupation. 
Needless to say, a retreat from neoliberalism by the PA would not just 
imply major internal political and social transformations. An equally dramatic 
shift would be required in Palestinian economic thinking about the role of 
public policy, the limitations of markets, and the need to direct and promote 
capital accumulation that bolsters productive capacity. In such a scenario, 
Palestinian economic power, such as it is, would have to be consolidated 
in a struggle to reclaim policy space and push back Israeli control through 
unilateral economic measures when feasible, pushing the limits of the Israeli 
envelope, brinkmanship, and wearing down Israeli patience.
The point is to actively seek new arrangements that would allow gradual 
separation from the Israeli economy, even while having to accept overall 
Israeli security and colonial control. What is important is that Palestinian 
economic policy under occupation not be subordinated to a state-formation 
program that is divorced from political realities, (mis)informed by flawed 
economic theory, and vulnerable to risk in the vacuum created by the disinte-
gration of the Palestinian national movement. Rather, state formation would 
be an outcome of, among other things, a publicly endorsed, sustained, and 
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phased program of economic resistance. This in turn calls for active trade 
policies designed to diversify Palestinian trade markets and products as a 
means of reducing overwhelming dependence on trade with and through 
Israel. The question to be asked, however, is whether it is not already too 
late, whether the neoliberal virus has not already penetrated the Palestinian 
policy-making establishment and its supporters so thoroughly as to consign 
the alternative (in fact the original) narrative of “liberating the land and the 
people” to a mere relic of the past.
force, coNseNt, aNd PersuasioN
It has long been known that polls monitoring the Palestinian perception 
of political developments are unreliable and must be interpreted carefully.52 
Still, one recent poll found a large majority of Palestinians, both in the West 
Bank and Gaza, to be very supportive of Salam Fayyad and his policies: 82 
percent of those surveyed believed that his policies “served the Palestinian 
interest” and 72 percent thought he “would be capable to be the next presi-
dent,” even though 54 percent did not believe that his statehood program 
would achieve its declared goal.53 
Such results could be seen as contradicting our claims that the PA pro-
gram has adverse implications for Palestinian society and the struggle for 
liberation. Most certainly they indicate that the general public (more in the 
West Bank than in Gaza) acknowledges improvements in service delivery 
and internal security. They also seem to indicate that while a majority of 
Palestinians do not think Fayyad’s program will succeed, they attribute the 
problem not to the program itself but to Israeli intransigence. Thus, the 
results might also indicate that the support reflects not so much conviction 
in the program as the general lack of alternatives amidst a deep political 
schism, not to mention the material dependencies on PA services, jobs, and 
infrastructure. 
However inconclusive these results, it is important to set them in a wider 
material, historical, and social context. To start with, any attempt to establish 
neoliberal hegemony relies not only on force (including symbolic violence),54 
but also on the local agency of active consent (or direct collaboration) and 
persuasion. Admittedly, the boundaries between active consent, persuasion, 
and force can be porous, and the following discussion can only hint at pos-
sible explanations for the “support” enjoyed by the PA’s neoliberal agenda in 
Palestinian society. 
Active consent is directly linked to the realization of and access to rewards, 
symbolic and material. Sections of the Palestinian society that actively con-
sent to and advance the neoliberal agenda are officials in the upper echelon 
of the PA hierarchy, the NGO-sector, and the portion of the capitalist class 
that benefits from the security reform-enabled, Israeli-sanctioned economic 
revival in the West Bank. The latter group consists of the high-value service 
sector including banking, insurance, and information technology, but also 
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restaurants, hotels, and real estate. All these groups have a material interest 
in the perpetuation of the political status quo. 
NGOs financed by international donors have played a particularly impor-
tant role here. From the start of the Oslo process, they were among the 
first sectors in Palestinian society to embrace neoliberalism, and they have 
acted as an important conduit of its development paradigm.55 Moreover, the 
“development industry” (and its local partners) has acted—wittingly or other-
wise—as an “anti-politics machine” that has depoliticized Palestinian society, 
sustained the occupation, and initiated the long march toward neoliberal 
hegemony that has found its most elaborate manifestation to date in the PA 
statehood plan.56
Persuasion aims at socializing and reproducing a given ideology through a 
dynamic interaction between material incentives on the one hand and public 
opinion conferred by media, educational institutions, think tanks, or intel-
lectuals on the other. The impact of persuasion works through the incentive 
of higher wages attainable in growth sectors and steady government salaries 
and also through the promise of social mobility for university graduates or 
those who hope eventually to benefit from economic growth. 
Persuasion is not restricted to the middle class, however. The disastrous 
conditions in Gaza, presented as the alternative to the PA experiment, are 
contrasted with the economic boom based in Ramallah as a demonstra-
tion effect of the price of resistance with which to appeal to all classes and 
regions in the occupied territories. The politics and discourse of persua-
sion, with its emphasis on pragmatism, moderation, and accommodation, is 
not new to Palestinian society and is usually associated with socializing the 
(changing) political positions of the PLO.57 But clothed in the modernism 
of the Fayyad appeal, it carries a new meaning and purpose today. At the 
same time, the content of the Hamas government’s persuasion, at least in its 
economic agenda, is similar, as the recent opening of a shopping mall and 
inauguration of a luxury hotel suggests. Nevertheless, it is notable that Fatah, 
at its Congress in 2009 and subsequent meetings of its new leadership, has 
refrained from formally endorsing the statehood program despite urgings to 
do so. While political maneuvering and suspicions of Fayyad’s political ambi-
tions may explain that reluctance, it might also signal an unwillingness to 
submit to all the implications of the neoliberal turn. 
As economists, we realize the role played here by economics as a disci-
pline and by Palestinian economists as a profession in the post-Oslo period—
even as we concede that their actual power is less than they may think.58 
Through their dissemination of economic knowledge in universities, think 
tanks, ministries, and international organizations, they have contributed, 
often lucratively, to establishing the neoliberal hegemony. The worse the 
political conditions on the ground, the more disconnected from these reali-
ties are their blueprints.59 Yet to accuse them of ignoring the realities would 
be to miss the point, as they have consciously chosen not to project them so 
as to not dilute the “science” of economic analysis. 
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The outcome of such analysis is manifested in popular beliefs that equate 
free trade with freedom, house ownership with state building, and an inde-
pendent central bank with political independence. Inevitably, then, such 
analysis has provided Israel with the material to win international—and 
Palestinian—support for its economic peace strategy, while at the same time 
providing the intellectual leadership for furthering the eminently political 
project of neoliberalizing Palestinian society and thus effectively abandoning 
its liberation. The irony of the situation is evidenced by the dissemination 
by Israeli diplomats in international forums of Palestinian-produced reports 
showcasing the West Bank economic miracle-in-the-making to support Israeli 
claims about the successes of economic peace.
As Karl Marx once noted, “The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, 
replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by mate-
rial force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped 
the masses.”60 Reflecting on this quote, it seems to us that the theory and 
material forces underlying the PA statehood program need to be laid bare 
so that meaningful theory can contribute to “liberating the land and the 
people.”
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A hilltop being prepared for the construction of Rawabi, the West Bank’s first 
Palestinian-planned city, on 6 October 2010. Designed to accommodate 40,000 
residents upon completion, the Qatari-backed project has been controversial 
among both Israelis and Palestinians since its outset. (Abbas Momani/AFP/
Getty Images)
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